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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**SUBJECT:** (Optional)

Realignment of SSC and CIB

FROM:DD/CA
Room 3D39 Hqs**EXTENSION****NO.****DATE**

23 February 1981

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)**DATE****OFFICER'S INITIALS****COMMENTS** (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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23 February 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security, P&M

FROM:

Deputy Director of Security, CA

SUBJECT: Realignment of SSC and CIB

1. This memorandum submits the details of a realignment of duties and functions in the DD/CA, specifically within the SSC and CIB. It does not reorganize work volume nor does it modify grade structures. It does make improvements in the management process.

2. Background: The Special Security Center and the Compartmented Information Branch have been integral parts of the Office of Security since the mid-fifties. Shortly after establishment of the Community Security Group in 1978, the SSC and CIB were assigned as part of the "community" function and the totality was designated as the OS Directorate for Community Affairs.

One major change was introduced in that reorganization, a GS-15 position and the policy making function of the Special Security Center were transferred to the Community Security Group.

3. Present Situation: The present organization of the DD/CA is reflected in the schematic at Tab A. Present encumbrances are noted in Tab A-1.

I see no changes necessary at this time in the management oversight of the Community Security Group.

There are an inordinate number of new tasks levied on the SSC and CIB. The Chief, Special Security Center is currently tasked to develop the 4C System and is required to devote almost 70% of his time to this responsibility. This task will continue for at least 12 months.

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The Security Officer assigned to the SAF/SS at the Pentagon is recently appointed. He inherited the task of participating in the salvage operation capitalizing on the good parts of APEX. He is also expected to devote a large percentage of his time to overall security of Program A of the SAF/SS.

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The GS-13 Security Officer [] at the SSC is the point man for liaison with those Non-NFIB agencies for which CIA has security cognizance in SCI matters. Part of his duties call for SCI security briefings as required in these agencies. The recent change in administration has increased the number of such briefings to the point where it is necessary to draw assistance from the Chief and officers in the SSC.

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The GS-14 Security Officer [] in the SSC is heavily engaged in facility certifications, zero based reviews of accesses at industrial facilities, CIA and Non-NFIB agencies, and security briefings. He will be most heavily engaged in MOUs with Non-NFIB recipients of Intelligence.

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The GS-11 Security Officer [] in the SSC performs an essential function in the instruction of registry personnel handling SCI materials, preparation of security procedural guidelines for SCI programs and in the recent past was mostly taken up with the mechanics aspect of SCI handling in the APEX study. She is now engaged in the APEX salvage activities. Since the procedural aspects of SCI handling under APEX were generally acceptable to the Community, Mrs. Mitchell will now devote most of her time to preparation of a procedures guide applicable throughout the SCI domain. This position depends for permanency on a favorable review by PM&CD.

At the present time the biggest need for realignment in the SSC stems from a need for support to the Chief in management of activities on a day-by-day basis.

The functions of the Compartmented Information Branch are unique in the Office of Security. CIB is a true service of common concern provided to all departments and agencies participating in the SCI arena. Established almost 17 years ago to relieve a perceived burden in the Community, the CIB continues to provide the Community with a central registry of SCI access approvals. While open to considerable criticism for one reason or another, the criticism must be shared with those who fail to maintain the data base with accurate and timely input. CIB continues to certify access approvals and

visits throughout the Community at a very high volume. The function of the CIB may be supplemented with greater assistance from automation when the 4C System is implemented in CY 1983, but its basic services will continue to be needed.

At the present time, CIB is without a Chief and Deputy Chief. The former is working full time with the development of a dedicated security system for use in the Survival of Government exercise. The Office of Security agreed to provide part time security support in the developmental phase of this activity in expectation that a security position (slot) would be forthcoming. It was expected that the OS Career Board would then process for filling this slot as another area security job. The slot has not materialized. The CIB cannot continue to function without relief for this task beyond April 1981.

The strain on the SSC in managing CIB has been increased by the illness and absence of the Deputy Chief of CIB. The unsuccessful efforts to fill two of the Record Clerk positions has been alleviated somewhat by our success in getting some part time help in the four "Budget Control" (I don't know where the title came from either) people. But they do not satisfy long term needs.

4. Problems: Essentially we suffer the same pain that seems to be endemic in OS. Too much to do with too few. The answer for the short range seems to be in aligning management roles a little differently. The answer for the long range seems to rest in application of the axe to cut some of the lower priority items that are buried under newer demands but which historically are perceived as a *raison d'etre* of the CIB.

Specifically someone is needed who can function simultaneously as Deputy Chief, SSC and Chief, CIB doing a back-up number on briefing overloads within the SSC and CIB and managing the day-to-day activities in both locations while C/SSC devotes time to 4C.

Someone else is needed to serve as the *de facto* boss within CIB and give him/her support in the form of a recognized leader in the CIB activities.

Further, the overview functions now ongoing on the floor of CIB need to be recognized and supported. The line of command is too fuzzy at the present. The arcane aspects of the SCI world, combined with an increasing dependency on ADP by CIB personnel speaks to the need to provide leadership, instructions and a larger dose of humanity to help customers of CIB's services. That type solution isn't to be found in the imposition of another layer of control and command. It has to be drawn from the current population of CIB.

5. Solutions Proposed: I propose that:

a. Assistance be given by the OS Career Board to relieve the CIB from duties as Security Officer for the Survival of Government exercise. This relief be extended no later than the end of April 1981.

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b. [] be designated a de facto Deputy Chief of the SSC and simultaneously Chief of CIB for day-to-day management oversight.

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c. [] be tasked with assuming the day-to-day operations of the CIB.

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d. [] be evaluated by [] and, if approved, be recognized as the principal assistant to [] with the task of running CIB's floor operations.

6. If these suggestions are viewed favorably, the T.O of the SSC and CIB would not change, but the schematic of the structure would be altered. The revision is reflected in Tab B.

7. Your comments are requested.

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Attachments

Distribution:

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